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Abstract: China’s current national policies promote high levels of economic growth, 
transforming China into a “world factory”, but at a high cost in terms of energy and the 
environment. At the same time, this growth and transformation also forms the backbone of 
China’s economy, underpinning social stability. China faces a dilemma to reconcile its 
economy, energy system and environmental security. Each aspect of this triad is discussed 
in this study to illuminate the challenges faced by China, and China’s dilemma in energy, 
economy and environment is analyzed from the perspective of its participation in current 
global supply chains. While China must import a significant proportion of its energy and a 
large proportion of primary materials, a large share of these imports are returned to the global 
market as industrial exports. China is bound by its own course of action and unable to 
radically change its position for the foreseeable future as the road to economic development 
and employment stability is through policies built on exports and shifting development 
models, presenting a tough socio-economic trade-off. China’s growth challenges are 
discussed as an example of challenges more broadly faced in the developing world. China’s 
success or failure in achieving a sustainable developmental pattern will inevitably have a 
significant influence on the global environment. 
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1. Introduction 
China is an excellent example of the current crises faced by the rapidly developing and emerging 
economies of the world, but with close to 20% of global population, it is a country that stands alone in 
its potential to show the benefits and failures, challenges and enablers of development. It can be argued 
that China’s unique size and nature as a centrally-planned economy may make it less of a representative 
example of the developing world, but we would argue that many of the decisions that must be made 
remain as representative challenges for the rest of the developing world. In this paper, we seek to broadly 
examine some of the key, intertwined challenges that affect the ability of developing nations to establish 
sustainable development transitions, drawing on the case of China. 
The sustainable development of developing countries is largely posited on the goal of attaining higher 
standards of living (including such development goals as high educational participation, good health and 
longevity), underpinned by improved economic performance. This economic performance in turn has 
largely been based to date on an industrialization pattern very similar to the path that the developed 
countries followed, though certain technological steps are being omitted, and the path is often being 
compressed in time (what took the developed countries over 200 years is being achieved in perhaps  
half that time in some developing nations). Importantly, economic growth requires energy and  
resources, which are largely being sought from non-renewable energy technologies and potentially  
the over-exploitation of natural resources. Thus, economic growth has largely come at a cost to the 
environment, which at some point, must either be rectified or present unavoidable barriers to further 
development. China’s success or failure in achieving a sustainable developmental pattern may serve as 
an example for the remainder of the developing world and will inevitably have a significant influence 
on the global environment. 
The energy, economy and environment (E3) issue is an intricate problem, where three separate strands 
intertwine in a complex knot. From the perspective of academic research, coordinated development of 
E3 in China has attracted much attention, especially subsequent to 2000. Current research can be divided 
into three areas: (1) establishing macro-simulation models, such as computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models, to optimize energy utilization by economic policies on the premise that environmental 
conditions remain unchanged or even improve [1,2]; (2) establishing evaluation indices and systems to 
assess the coordinated development of the E3 system [3,4]; and (3) establishing econometric models to 
study the co-integration relationship of the E3system [5]. Ma et al. [6] undertook a comprehensive 
literature review on the co-integration of the energy and economic system in China, observing that most 
existing studies demonstrate a causal relationship between national aggregate energy consumption and 
national aggregate economic growth in China. Although research on the E3 issue in China has attracted 
much attention in the current academic literature, the conflicting relationships between and within the 
energy, the economic and the environmental sectors of China still lack clear elucidation. This paper will 
first review each aspect of the E3 triad to illuminate the dilemmas faced by China when interacting with 
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the rest of the world and then will discuss the reasons why it is difficult for China to address these  
E3 dilemmas. 
2. Three “E’s” of China: Energy, Economy and Environment Challenges 
2.1. Energy Context  
Coal dominates current energy consumption in China, accounting for 66.0% of the total energy 
consumed in 2013 [7]. China is the world’s largest coal producer, with Chinese coal production, as a 
proportion of global output, growing from 16.2% in 1981 to nearly 50% in 2013 [8]; however, growth 
in consumption since 2003, when China was a major world coal exporter (second only to Australia), has 
meant that since 2009, China has become a net coal importer. According to the General Administration 
of Customs of China [9], China imported 290 million metric tons (Mt) of coal in 2012, making it the 
largest importer of coal in the world. Recent studies have questioned the longevity of China’s domestic 
coal reserves [10,11] and identified China’s “peak coal” status [12–14]. Oil accounted for only 17.8% 
of China’s total energy consumption in 2013, far lower levels than those of the OECD countries, lower 
even than the world average. However, China’s oil consumption in absolute terms is the second largest 
in the world with the degree of dependence on foreign oil reaching 58% in 2013. The largest oil fields 
in China (Daqing and Shengli) have already reached their peak production [15,16], leaving only limited 
possibilities for increased domestic oil production. Natural gas makes up only a few percent of China’s 
energy system, even though gas demand is growing rapidly [17], and studies indicate that China’s 
domestic gas resources cannot be developed rapidly enough to match this surge in demand [18]. This 
will lead China into future reliance on gas imports and competition with the EU and other international 
actors for available exports. 
Continued depletion of “easy” fossil energy will force producers to develop more challenging 
hydrocarbon deposits (e.g., shale oil and deep-water oil) with increased costs in both economic, 
environmental and energy terms. The energy cost for producing fossil energy is increasing, and the 
energy return on investment (EROI) is declining in China. Hu et al. [19] pointed out that the EROI for 
China’s oil and natural gas production sector fluctuated from 12–14:1 in the mid-1990s and declined to 
10:1 in 2007–2010. EROI for the coal production sector has declined from 35:1 in 1995–1997 to about 
27:1 in 2010. The predicted EROI of both sectors will continue to decline until 2020. A declining EROI 
implies that more and more energy output would have to be devoted simply to obtaining energy. While 
currently, the EROI is still significantly higher than the limitation of one (at or below which the 
extraction of energy resource is effectively a loss of energy), it must be considered that this limit may 
eventually be reached. The rate of approach to this limit is an important forecasting parameter to which 
close attention should be paid. Although it is anticipated that the cost of fuel will closely parallel the 
EROI on a global basis, the domestic price of extraction has the potential to remain hidden as imports 
are increased. 
China may obtain additional energy resources through overseas cooperation or acquisition of external 
resources, where strong finances and a distinctive political attitude, with government and industry in 
close cooperation, enable China to develop resources that few Western companies could or would invest 
in. However, it should be noted that there are difficulties and risks due to political instability in many 
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resource-rich locations, such as the Middle East and North Africa, continuing in the wake of the Arab 
Spring. China’s expansion into the global oil and gas industry, while in part focused on obtaining 
sufficient domestic supply, has been argue to potentially harm international energy security rather than 
improving it [20].  
Thus, on the supply side, energy in China is still largely fossil-fuel based, and growth in domestic 
demand further threatens the country’s self-sufficiency, although its financial capability enables energy 
security to be maintained at present. However, such factors as the near (or perhaps passed) peak in 
domestic oil and coal production and the decreasing EROI should give pause to policy makers to 
seriously consider the implications of the consumption of depleting resources within a longer term 
sustainability perspective. Self-sufficiency or energy security as a goal in itself should direct policy 
towards investment in renewable energy resources in the mid-term, but currently, cost and capacity 
limitations are constraining rapid expansion, particularly in order to meet the exceedingly high energy 
growth rates of the current economic development strategy. On the demand side, rapid growth in the 
industrial sector has supported a vital export-oriented economy, which the government is now aiming to 
focus more on internal markets.  
2.2. Economic Aspects 
China’s economic growth has driven and been fuelled by a large energy requirement. It is 
questionable whether China can stop this pattern of demand for fossil energy through changes to its 
economic structure, with findings in recent years indicating sustained and rapid growth in China’s energy 
demand [21–29]. This outlook is unlikely to change even considering anthropogenic climate change in 
the long term, although a potential for the reduction of the impact through an improved energy mix, 
industrial structural adjustments and enhanced technological developments cannot be rejected [30]. 
Concurrently, significant energy is still required to support further economic growth. Thus, the peak of 
energy consumption is expected to occur later than the peak production year for both oil [31] and coal [10]. 
Two observations can further illuminate this phenomenon. The first is the rapid expansion of China’s 
automobile fleet. Fast economic development has brought continuous improvement in people’s living 
standards, and these rising living standards manifest themselves in a booming demand for automobiles. 
Over the last 10 years, the total number of civil vehicles increased from 20.5 million in 2002 to  
120.9 million in 2012 with an average annual growth rate of 19.4%. Among these, the total number of 
registered private vehicles increased from 9.7 million to 93.1 million with an average annual growth rate 
of 25.4% over the same period [32]. China’s GDP per capita has already reached over 6700 USD in 
2013, permitting a growing medium-high and medium income population to acquire and use automobiles. 
Transportation will continue to consume more energy, especially oil, since other forms of energy cannot 
yet substitute for oil as a transportation fuel at the scope and scale required.  
The second observation relates to the heterogeneous levels of economic development witnessed 
throughout China. In a vast country such as China, there are both historic and geographic reasons for 
regional differences in economic development [33–35]. Some eastern regions of China have already 
entered a stage of economic development comparable to moderately-developed countries, presenting a 
gradually stabilized energy consumption trend. In contrast, the majority of the central and western regions 
are still undergoing extensive economic growth. These regions reflect the initial stages of industrialization 
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focused on low-level construction/manufacturing, typical of patterns of earlier industrialization in the 
eastern areas of China. Therefore, China’s energy consumption and energy-related CO2 emissions have 
different profiles depending on the region being examined [36]. Since the regional difference in 
economic development in China is considerable, demand could be expected to rise dramatically as 
standards of living rise in areas of low GDP per capita [37]. 
2.3. Environmental Concerns 
There are many key environmental impacts attributable to energy production and consumption, 
including anthropogenic climate change, particulate emissions and water pollution. Energy production 
and consumption have become one of the main reasons for environmental deterioration in China. In 
recent years, serious haze has become the dominant environmental issue for not only the government, 
but also the Chinese public [38]. Most air pollution in China results from coal combustion, which is the 
source of 90% of SO2 emissions, 70% of dust emissions and 67% of NOx emissions [39]. A coal-dominated 
energy structure is the major reason for this atmospheric pollution [40]. Anthropogenic global warming 
is perhaps the most important global issue of the 21st century [41], and nearly 72.5% of China’s total 
CO2 emissions were from coal in 2010 [40]. Coal will continue to dominate China’s energy consumption 
and production system in the foreseeable future, challenging the government in its pursuit of a 
greenhouse gas abatement policy in the short-to-medium term [42]. On the international stage, this 
makes China appear to be one of the main perpetrators of anthropogenic global warming and places the 
nation’s diplomats in a tough position caught between demands to decarbonize and domestic calls for 
more energy to sustain economic development. Developing alternative energy is certainly an option in 
theory, but will take time and significant investment to realize the benefits [43]. Moreover, China’s use 
of coal for construction minerals (cement and steel) is currently exceedingly difficult to substitute for 
renewable alternatives anywhere in the world; thus, these key materials of development are almost 
unavoidable emitters of greenhouse gases [44]. China’s national energy policy has also plunged its 
renewable industrial development into a passive state [45]. Recent amendments to this policy have 
mitigated some of the problems [46], although it is still too early to fully evaluate the effectiveness of 
these changes in promoting non-fossil energy sources. According to the Chinese government’s 
renewable energy medium- and long-term development plans [47], non-fossil fuel energy will account 
for 15% of total energy use in 2020. Even if this target can be achieved successfully, fossil fuels will still 
be the main source for China’s energy consumption mix. Depletion of conventional fossil fuels can 
potentially trigger increased economic pressure to develop unconventional hydrocarbon resources, 
ranging from shale gas to oil sands. However, the EROI is less for these resources, and hence, the carbon 
footprint is also higher than more conventional hydrocarbon sources, making the emission problem even 
worse [48]. It is likely that unconventional oil and gas will be affected by future climate change 
mitigation initiatives [49]. 
  
Sustainability 2015, 7 5513 
 
 
3. China’s Dilemmas in Energy, Economy and Environment 
3.1. China’s Development Model and E3 Dilemmas 
China initiated an open-door policy with economic reform in 1978. A capital-intensive, export-oriented 
economy has led to spectacular economic growth, lifting millions of Chinese people out of poverty. 
However, it has also given rise to unprecedented levels of energy consumption and environmental pollution. 
This has been claimed to pose a threat to energy and environmental security [50]. Environmental hazards 
have spread far beyond the cities, and rural environmental issues are increasingly acute [51]. China’s 
environmental sustainability index remains among one of the lowest in the world, despite government 
efforts to reduce further deterioration in the environment [52].  
China’s dilemma in energy, economy and environment can be analyzed from the perspective of its 
participation in current global supply chains. China is one of the countries furthest upstream in global 
supply chains, primarily producing raw materials and low-level manufactured goods for export. In fact, 
international exports have been a primary driver for China’s economic growth over the last decade, 
especially since accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. 
While China must import a significant proportion of its energy and a large proportion of primary 
materials, a large share of these imports is returned to the global market as industrial exports. Kahrl and 
Roland-Holst [53] point out that since 2002, the energy required to generate exports have been the largest 
source of energy demand growth in China. Therefore, as a “world factory”, China distributes a lot of 
embodied energy to other countries through inexpensive “made in China” products, and this embodied 
energy has tended to increase over time [54]. Taking embodied oil as an example, China’s net oil exports 
embodied in international trade were estimated to be 78.69 million tons (Mt) in 2011, while they were 
only 24.83 Mt in 1997 and 28.99 Mt in 2002 [55]. Many countries benefit from China’s embodied energy 
exports: the U.K., for example, has been the largest net embodied energy importer since 2008 and this 
accounts for 43% of the U.K.’s total net embodied fossil energy imports [56]. In a manner similar to that 
of embodied energy, globalized trade has numerous implications for the environment, since trade creates 
a mechanism by which consumers can shift the environmental pollution associated with their 
consumption to different parts of the world. China has paid a high environmental price for its export 
capacity. Research shows that rapid growth in China’s exports is a key determinant in China’s rising 
CO2 emissions and that Chinese consumption-based CO2 emissions are much less than production-based 
emissions [57–61]. In the current global supply chain context, production methodologies encourage 
leakages through trade that may do more to displace than to reduce CO2 emissions [62]. Besides CO2 
emissions, an explosive expansion of exports also brings many other environmental problems. Total 
quantities of wastewater, sulfur dioxide and solid waste embodied in exports have increased dramatically 
from 1997–2007 [63].  
3.2. Shifting Development Models Present a Tough Trade-Off in China 
The percentage of China’s economic production that was domestically consumed decreased from 
62.3% in 2000 to 51.8% in 2012, despite the many policies aimed at stimulating domestic consumption 
since 2000 [64]. China’s economic growth is essentially a development trap based on a model dependent 
on exports, and China exports much embodied energy and CO2 emissions as a part of this trade. This 
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reduces both economic development and divests purchasing countries of some of their environmental 
costs, raising the issue of who should be responsible for these export overheads. The Chinese government 
reasonably wants importers to cover some, if not all, of these costs [65]; and economists would argue 
that an effective carbon taxation scheme with full cost pass-on to the consumer would be one method of 
achieving this. The domestic implications of imposing an effective environmental tax or stricter 
regulations on emissions (combined with effective monitoring and full pass-on of costs to consumers) 
may cause significant hardship to the populous and difficulty for the government. At the same time, such 
a long-sighted policy would impact the global competitiveness of Chinese products, effecting their 
income from trade and potentially slowing growth and development. It is proving to be very challenging 
to find solutions to this problem from a broad and balanced perspective [65], but it should also be noted 
that this is an economic development model that China has chosen to follow, not forced on it by others. 
Net exports of embodied energy and CO2 emissions are the inevitable results of China’s present 
economic development model, and this model creates many job opportunities for China, which have 
been important for successive Chinese governments. For example, China’s international exports dropped 
dramatically during the global economic crises in 2009, and about 20 million migrant workers in coastal 
regions lost their jobs directly and had to return to their hometowns in rural regions according to Chinese 
government statistics [66]. This would be exacerbated if indirect unemployment was considered. China 
needs to make the trade-off between reducing embodied energy exports and changing the current 
development model of exporting resource-intensive products. One method could be to first rank the 
export sectors from the perspective of trade-off costs and then gradually reducing embodied energy 
exports starting with sectors with a relatively low trade-off cost on unemployment. 
3.3. The Fourth “E”: Equity 
As mentioned earlier, there are large disparities in the level of development across different regions 
of China. This has significant implications for a fourth “E”, namely equity. Such disparities in living 
standards and opportunities are key drivers of tensions between regions. Moreover, the inequity of trade 
in embodied emissions that China sees with the importers of her goods is mirrored in the regions of the 
nation. Economic progress in the east has depended on the degradation of environments in the central 
and western regions. At the same time, opportunity is not being traded back to these regions with lower 
levels of income prevalent. The government’s integrity will be tested by the performance on such 
distributive issues. 
3.4. Sustainability Considerations 
The E3 dilemma, from a relatively short-term perspective, offers insights into the political difficulties 
of balancing the growth and environmental implications of rapidly-expanding economies. However, it 
also highlights the limitations of short-term planning in the face of long-term growth targets and 
environmental constraints. Domestic energy supply in China using fossil fuels is already insufficient to 
meet domestic demand, and reliance on imports is growing rather than declining. While unconventional 
resources of fossil fuels, e.g., shale oil, might alleviate the self-sufficiency temporarily, the decreasing 
EROI and the peaking of domestic resource production should act as clear indicators that the ultimate 
trajectory is unsustainable. While imports of fossil fuels can alleviate concerns over this issue for some 
Sustainability 2015, 7 5515 
 
 
time, the parallel growth of demand in other developing countries and the subsequent increasing 
competition for resources must ultimately drive prices up, bringing the issue finally into the field of 
vision of politicians. While the current rate of growth could not easily be met by renewable energy 
technologies (capacity expansion is slower on an absolute scale than conventional technologies), it is 
also apparent that renewable energy holds solutions to two of the three E’s: environment and energy. It 
has been widely argued that grid parity is being reached in many markets around the world for 
renewables, such as wind and solar [67]; China and other developing countries still face affordability 
challenges for such technologies. The economic component is therefore still lagging. The timing of rapid 
expansion into renewables should be considered closely by the government of China, particularly since 
the country possesses many of the critical mineral resources [68] and the manufacturing facilities to 
produce these technologies for domestic use (although currently, they are mostly exported). Ultimately, 
sustainability for China from the E3 perspective must take adequate account of resource depletion, and 
perhaps, more effective internalization of the current costs of environmentally-damaging energy 
technologies is one potential approach to shift the balance of affordability in favor of cleaner alternatives. 
4. Conclusions 
Countries inevitably face conflicting policy choices surrounding economic growth, energy resource 
utilization and environmental degradation when pursuing rapid development [69,70]. China’s current 
national policies have promoted economic growth, and whilst transforming China into a “world factory”, 
this growth has come at a high energy and environmental cost. This E3 dilemma that China faces has 
been outlined and examined in this paper; however, it is very difficult for China to find easy solutions 
to this complicated problem in the short term. At present, China is bound by its own course of action 
and unable to radically change its position for the foreseeable future, as the road to economic 
development and employment stability is through policies built on exports. Therefore, a trade-off 
between China’s net exports of embodied energy and CO2 emissions and their contributions to economic 
development and employment stability for the population should be sought quantitatively, and such 
studies are to be encouraged in the future. China should understand that it is not a simple restructuring 
task to reduce the embodied energy export, even if such reforms are motivated in the best interests of 
future prosperity and sustainable development. China cannot bear the whole trade-off cost if it wishes to 
reduce embodied energy exports, because of its large economy and population base, which ultimately 
necessitates long-term reform. Furthermore, China cannot ensure its own energy and environmental 
security alone and isolated from the international community, especially considering the bonds of global 
trade that tie the rest of the world to China. This intersection of energy, economy and environmental 
issues has crossed both the geographic and socioeconomic boundaries of sovereign states. 
From China’s perspective, it should identify balanced policies that offer the best trade-off between 
these components. Since China cannot complete a low-cost industrialization process in energy and 
environmental terms in the same manner that the developed countries did, China needs to carefully 
review and inspect the fossil energy-dependent industrialized society that has arisen, as the 
environmental and energy self-sufficiency concerns are real sustainability issues for the nation in the 
long term. We recommend that such debates and studies in today’s developing context should be 
encouraged in China, as they will be conducive in developing a better understanding of how to solve 
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those complicated problems, problems that not only China must confront, but that are significant 
concerns for future global development.  
Acknowledgments 
We thank Gail Tverberg for helpful comments. The authors also would like to give many thanks to 
the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project Nos. 71303258, 71373285), the National Social 
Science Funds of China (Project No. 13&ZD159), the Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher 
Education of China (Project No. 20120007120015), the MOE (Ministry of Education in China) Project 
of Humanities and Social Sciences (Project No. 13YJC630148), Special Fund Project for Beijing 
Excellent Doctoral Dissertation Supervisor(Project No. 20121141402 )and the Science Foundation of 
China University of Petroleum, Beijing (Project No. BJ-2011-03), for sponsoring this joint research. 
Author Contributions 
Xu Tang designed the study, wrote the manuscript and revised it until its final version.  
Benjamin C. McLellan revised the manuscript. Simon Snowden participated in designing the study. 
Baosheng Zhang supervised the whole work and edited the manuscript. Mikael Höök provided good 
advice throughout the paper. 
Conflicts of Interest 
The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
References 
1. Wei, Y.M.; Wu, G.; Liu, L.C.; Fan, Y. Progress in modeling for energy-economy-environment 
complex system and its applications. Chin. J. Manag. 2005, 2, 159–170. 
2. Zhang, S.W. Review of the status quo and future development of energy-economy-environment 
models. Energy Technol. Econ. 2010, 2, 43–49. 
3. Zhao, T.; Li, X.Y. Research on the coordinating evaluation model for energy-economy-environment 
system. J. Beijing Inst. Technol. 2008, 2, 11–16. 
4. Fan, Z.Q.; Cao, M. Measurement and evaluation of coordinate developmental state of  
energy-economy-environment system. Forecasting 2005, 4, 66–70. 
5. Song, J.K.; Jia, J.T. Research on the dynamic cointegration of energy-economy-environment system 
of China-the econometric analysis based on VEC model. J. Ind. Technol. Econ. 2012, 8, 46–52. 
6. Ma, H.Y.; Oxley, L.; Gibson, J. China’s energy economy: A survey of the literature. Econ. Syst. 
2010, 2, 105–132. 
7. National Bureau of Statistics of China. Total Consumption of Energy and Its Composition. In China 
Statistical Yearbook; China Statistics Press: Beijing, China, 2013. 
8. BP. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Available online: http://www.bp.com/content/ 
dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2014/BP-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2014-
full-report.pdf (accessed on 24 June 2014).  
Sustainability 2015, 7 5517 
 
 
9. General Administration of Customs of China. Customs Statistics. Available online: 
http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab44604/module109000/info414072.htm (accessed 
on 21 January 2013). 
10. Lin, B.Q.; Liu, J.H. Estimating coal production peak and trends of coal imports in China.  
Energy Policy 2010, 38, 512–519. 
11. Höök, M.; Zittel, W.; Schindler, J.; Aleklett, K. Global coal production outlooks based on a logistic 
model. Fuel 2010, 11, 3546–3558. 
12. Tao, Z.P.; Li, M.Y. What is the limit of Chinese coal supplies—A STELLA model of Hubbert Peak. 
Energy Policy 2007, 6, 3145–3154. 
13. Lin, B.Q.; Liu, J.H.; Yang, Y.C. Impact of carbonintensity and energysecurityconstraints on China’s 
coal import. Energy Policy 2012, 48, 137–147. 
14. Wang, J.L.; Feng, L.Y.; Tverberg, G.E. An analysis of China’s coal supply and its impact on China’s 
future economic growth. Energy Policy 2013, 57, 542–551. 
15. Tang, X.; Zhang, B.S.; Höök, M.; Feng, L.Y. Forecast of oil reserves and production in Daqing 
oilfield of China. Energy 2010, 7, 3097–3102.  
16. Höök, M.; Bardi, U.; Feng, L.Y.; Pang, X.Q. Development of oil formation theories and their 
importance for peak oil. Mar. Pet. Geol. 2010, 9, 1995–2004. 
17. Li, J.C.; Dong, X.C.; Shangguan, J.; Höök, M. Forecasting the growth of China’s natural gas 
consumption. Energy 2011, 3, 1380–1385. 
18. Lin, B.Q.; Wang, T. Forecasting natural gas supply in China: Production peak and import trends. 
Energy Policy 2012, 49, 225–233. 
19. Hu, Y.; Hall, C.A.S.; Wang, J.Y.; Feng, L.Y.; Poisson, A. Energy Return on Investment (EROI) of 
China’s conventional fossil fuels: Historical and future trends. Energy 2013, 54, 352–364. 
20. Leung, G.C.K. China’s energy security: Perception and reality. Energy Policy 2011, 3, 1330–1337. 
21. Lu, X.; Lei, S. Household energy demand of China towards a well-off society by 2020.  
Energy Procedia 2011, 5, 1676–1681. 
22. Liu, J.; Chen, W.Y.; Liu, D.S. Scenario analysis of China’s future energy demand based on TIMES 
model system. Energy Procedia 2011, 5, 1803–1808. 
23. Zhang, H.B.; Zhong, N. Forecast of Energy Demand in the Next Decade. Energy Procedia 2011, 5, 
2536–2539. 
24. Yu, S.W.; Wei, Y.M.; Wang, K. APSO–GA optimal model to estimate primary energy demand of 
China. Energy Policy 2012, 42, 329–340. 
25. Yu, S.W.; Wei, Y.M.; Wang, K. China’s primary energy demands in 2020: Predictions from an 
MPSO–RBF estimation model. Energy Convers. Manag. 2012, 61, 59–66. 
26. Yu, S.W.; Zhu, K.J. A hybrid procedure for energy demand forecasting in China. Energy 2012, 1, 
396–404. 
27. You, J. China’s challenge for decarbonized growth: Forecasts from energy demand models.  
J. Policy Model. 2013, 4, 652–668. 
28. Shan, B.G.; Xu, M.J.; Zhu, F.G.; Zhang, C.L. China’s Energy Demand Scenario Analysis in 2030. 
Energy Procedia 2012, 14, 1292–1298. 
29. Feng, L.Y.; Hu, Y.; Hall, C.A.; Wang, J.L. The Chinese Oil Industry: History and Future; Springer: 
New York, NY, USA, 2012; ISBN 978-1-4419-9409-7. 
Sustainability 2015, 7 5518 
 
 
30. Fan, Y.; Xia, Y. Exploring energy consumption and demand in China. Energy 2012, 1, 23–30. 
31. Feng, L.Y.; Tang, X.; Zhao, L. Reasonable Planning of Oil Production in China Based on Peak Oil 
Model. Pet. Explor. Dev. 2007, 4, 497–501. 
32. National Bureau of Statistics of China. Possession of Private Vehicles. In China Statistical 
Yearbook; China Statistics Press: Beijing, China, 2013. 
33. Cheng, J.Y.; Zhang, M.J. Regional differences and sustainable development in China. J. Chin. Polit. 
Sci. 1999, 1, 1–50.  
34. Arayama, Y.; Miyoshi, K. Regional Diversity and Sources of Economic Growth in China. World Econ. 
2004, 10, 1583–1607. 
35. Liu, J.Y.; Zhang, Q.; Hu, Y.F. Regional differences of China’s urban expansion from late 20th to 
early 21st century based on remote sensing information. Chin. Geogr. Sci. 2012, 1, 1–14. 
36. Li, H.N.; Mu, H.L.;Zhang, M.; Gui S.S. Analysis of regional difference on impact factors of China’s 
energy-Related CO2 emissions. Energy 2012, 1, 319–326. 
37. Ito, T.; Chen, Y.Q.; Ito, S.; Yamaguchi, K. Prospect of the upper limit of the energy demand in 
China from regional aspects. Energy 2010, 12, 5320–5327. 
38. Li, M.N.; Zhang, L.L. Haze in China: Current and future challenges. Environ. Pollut. 2014, 6,  
85–86. 
39. Chen, W.Y.; Xu, R.N. Clean coal technology development in China. Energy Policy 2010, 5,  
2123–2130. 
40. Boden, T.A.; Marland, G.; Andres, R.J. Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions; 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of 
Energy: Oak Ridge, TN, USA, 2013. 
41. IPCC. Climate Change 2007—Fourth Assessment Report. Available online: http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
(accessed on 17 November 2007). 
42. Bloch, H.; Rafiq, S.; Salim, R. Coal consumption, CO2 emission and economic growth in China: 
Empirical evidence and policy responses. Energy Econ. 2012, 2, 518–528. 
43. Höök, M.; Li, J.C.; Johansson, K.; Snowden, S. Growth rates of global energy systems and future 
outlooks. Nat. Resour. Res. 2012, 1, 23–41. 
44. McLellan, B.C.; Corder, G.D.; Giurco, D.P.; Ishihara, K.N. Renewable energy in the minerals 
industry: A review of global potential. J. Clean. Product. 2012, 32, 32–44. 
45. Zhang, P.D.; Yang, Y.L.; Shi, J.; Zheng, Y.H.; Wang, L.S.; Li, X.R. Opportunities and challenges 
for renewable energy policy in China. Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 2009, 2, 439–449. 
46. Schuman, S.; Lin, A. China’s renewable energy law and its impact on renewable power in China: 
Progress, challenges and recommendations for improving implementation. Energy Policy 2012, 51, 
89–109. 
47. NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission). Renewable Energy Medium and  
Long-Term Development Plan. Available online: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-09/05/ 
content_738243.htm (accessed on 5 September 2007). 
48. Brandt, A.R.; Farrell, A.E.Scraping the bottom of the barrel: greenhouse gas emission consequences 
of a transition to low-quality and synthetic petroleum resources. Clim. Chang. 2007, 3–4, 241–263.  
49. Chan, G.; Reilly, J.; Paltsev, S.; Chen, Y.-H.H. The Canadian oil sands industry under carbon 
constraints. Energy Policy 2012, 50, 540–550. 
Sustainability 2015, 7 5519 
 
 
50. Xue, P.L.; Zeng, W.H. Policy issues on the control of environmental accident hazards in China and 
their implementation. Procardia Environ. Sci. 2010, 2, 440–445.  
51. Wang, C.M.; Lin, Z.L. Environmental Policies in China over the Past 10 Years: Progress, Problems 
and Prospects. Procedia Environ. Sci. 2010, 2, 1701–1712. 
52. Liu, J.G.; Diamond, J. Revolutionizing China’s environmental protection. Science 2008, 319,  
37–38. 
53. Kahrl, F.; Roland-Holst, D. Energy and exports in China. China Econ. Rev. 2008, 4, 649–658.  
54. Liu, H.T.; Xi, Y.M.; Guo, J.; Li, X. Energy embodied in the international trade of China: An energy 
input–output analysis. Energy Policy 2010, 8, 3957–3964. 
55. Tang, X.; Snowden, S.; Höök, M. Analysis of energy embodied in the international trade of UK. 
Energy Policy 2013, 57, 418–428. 
56. Tang, X.; Zhang, B.S.; Feng, L.Y.; Snowden, S.; Höök, M. Net oil exports embodied in China’s 
international trade: An input–output analysis. Energy 2012, 1, 464–471.  
57. Lin, B.Q.; Sun, C.W. Evaluating carbon dioxide emissions in international trade of China.  
Energy Policy 2010, 1, 613–621. 
58. Yan, Y.F.; Yang, L.K. China’s foreign trade and climate change: A case study of CO2 emissions. 
Energy Policy 2010, 1, 350–356. 
59. Ma, S.Z.; Chen, Y. Estimation of China’s Embodied CO2 Emissions during 2000–2009.  
China World Econ. 2011, 6, 109–126. 
60. Xu, M.; Li, R.; Crittenden, J.C.; Chen, Y.S. CO2 emissions embodied in China’s exports from 2002 
to 2008: A structural decomposition analysis. Energy Policy 2011, 11, 7381–7388. 
61. Erik, D.; Pei, J.S.; Yang, C.H. Trade, production fragmentation, and China’s carbon dioxide 
emissions. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 2012, 1, 88–101. 
62. Pan, J.H.; Phillips, J.; Chen, Y. China’s balance of emissions embodied in trade: Approaches to 
measurement and allocating international responsibility. Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 2008, 2,  
354–376. 
63. Zhang, C.; Beck, M.B.; Chen, J.N. Gauging the impact of global trade on China’s local 
environmental burden. J. Clean. Product. 2013, 54, 270–281. 
64. National Bureau of Statistics of China. Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Approach. In China 
Statistical Yearbook; China Statistics Press: Beijing, China, 2013. 
65. Zhang, Z.X. Who should bear the cost of China’s carbon emissions embodied in goods for exports? 
Miner. Econ. 2012, 2–3, 103–117. 
66. Chinese Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs. About 20 Million Migrant 
Workers in China Lost Their Jobs and Back Home due to Financial Crisis. Available online: 
http://news.sohu.com/20090202/n262012610.shtml (accessed on 2 February 2009). 
67. Breyer, C.; Gerlach, A. Global overview on grid-parity. Prog. Photovolt. 2013, 21, 121–136.  
68. McLellan, B.; Corder, G.; Ali, S. Sustainability of rare earths—An overview of the state of 
knowledge. Minerals 2013, 3, 304–317. 
69. Apergis, N.; Payne, J.E. The causal dynamics between coal consumption and growth: evidence from 
emerging market economies. Appl. Energy 2010, 6, 1972–1977. 
  
Sustainability 2015, 7 5520 
 
 
70. Singh, K. India’s emissions in a climate constrained world. Energy Policy 2011, 6, 3476–3482. 
© 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
